Unconscious mind

Linguistics

Cognitive psychology

Process (computing)

Philosophy

Psychoanalysis

Neuroscience

Glossary

Social psychology

Dual process theory (moral psychology)

Cognition

Operating system

Computer science

Typology

Anthropology

Proposition

Cognitive science

Psychology

Political science

Epistemology

Sociology

Autonomy

Dual (grammatical number)

Trends in Cognitive Sciences

Melnikoff and Bargh [ 1 Melnikoff D.E. Bargh J.A. The mythical number two. Trends Cogn. Sci. 2018; 22: 280-293 Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (190) Google Scholar ] offer a challenge to what they term the dual-process typology (see Glossary): specifically, the idea that cognitive processing is either unintentional, uncontrollable, unconscious, and efficient (Type 1) or intentional, controllable, conscious, and inefficient (Type 2). The authors argue that no one has ever tested this proposition and they provide examples of thoughts that do not abide by the proposed featural configuration of the typology (e.g., that processing might be unconscious but also intentional). These examples, it is argued, invalidate the common ‘two-types framework’ and the authors conclude that distinguishing between two types of processes is ‘systematically thwarting scientific progress’ (Abstract). However, the authors make a critical error that undermines this conclusion: one need not assert alignment among a set of features to argue that one specific feature can be justified as a dual-process dichotomy (in contrast to unimodal theories, which argue for continuous processing). introduced by Evans and Stanovich [4Evans J.S.B.T. Stanovich K.E. Dual-process theories of higher cognition: advancing the debate.Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 2013; 8: 223-241Crossref PubMed Scopus (2058) Google Scholar]; single characteristics or sets of characteristics that distinguish between Type 1 and Type 2 processes. For example, some theorists have focused on autonomy as a defining feature of Type 1 processes (i.e., processing is either mandatory given the presence of triggering conditions – Type 1 – or not mandatory – Type 2) [11Pennycook G. A perspective on the theoretical foundation of dual-process models.in: De Neys W. Dual Process Theory 2.0. Routledge, 2017: 5-39Crossref Google Scholar, 12Thompson V.A. Why it matters: the implications of autonomous processes for dual process theories – commentary on Evans & Stanovich.Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 2013; 8: 253-256Crossref PubMed Scopus (66) Google Scholar]. a class of theories in which two fundamentally different types of cognitive processes are distinguished. a term introduced by Melnikoff and Bargh [1Melnikoff D.E. Bargh J.A. The mythical number two.Trends Cogn. Sci. 2018; 22: 280-293Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (190) Google Scholar] to represent the idea that cognitive processes can be sorted into two types with aligned characteristics: (i) Type 1 processes, which are unintentional, uncontrollable, unconscious, and efficient; (ii) Type 2 processes, which are intentional, controllable, conscious, and inefficient. also introduced by Evans and Stanovich; the various characteristics that have been associated with Type 1 and Type 2 processes (e.g., intentionality, controllability, consciousness, efficiency) but do not define the distinction for a given DPT. a class of theories in which cognitive processing is thought to occur only along a continuum.

The Mythical Dual-Process Typology