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Gender differences in bargaining with asymmetric information
Abstract
We conduct an experiment on gender differences in bargaining with asymmetric information. Based on Abreu and Gul (2000), we introduce asymmetric information about commitments by inducing irrational types, who never back down from a fixed bargaining position. Bargaining behavior depends on whether gender is revealed or not. When gender is unknown, men are more likely to mimic irrational types than women, but this gender gap is eliminated when...
Paper Details
Title
Gender differences in bargaining with asymmetric information
Published Date
Oct 1, 2021
Volume
86
Pages
102415 - 102415
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