Finance

Physics

Business

Stackelberg competition

Government (linguistics)

Subsidy

Geodesy

Civil engineering

Precast concrete

Engineering

Environmental economics

Philosophy

Order (exchange)

Benchmark (surveying)

Economics

Geography

Microeconomics

Transport engineering

Linguistics

Quantum mechanics

Yard

Market economy

Cleaner Logistics and Supply Chain

This paper considers promoting off-site construction using government subsidy. A three-stage Stackelberg game model is formulated for the optimal subsidy design for the government, accounting for the decisions of government, suppliers (owners of off-site construction yards), and customers (entities that buy precast concrete from the suppliers). The government has two objectives: one is to maximize the use of precast concrete produced by regional yards and the other is to reduce green-house gas emissions from the transport of precast concrete. A number of properties of the three-stage Stackelberg game framework have been analyzed. We find that an inappropriately designed subsidy scheme may decrease the use of precast concrete produced by regional yards and increase green-house gas emissions from the transport of precast concrete, compared with a no-subsidy benchmark.

Stackelberg game analysis of government subsidy on sustainable off-site construction and low-carbon logistics