Public economics

Finance

Mathematical economics

Mechanism design

Valuation (finance)

Value (mathematics)

Mathematics

Politics

Welfare

Mathematical optimization

Quadratic equation

Epistemology

Variety (cybernetics)

Machine learning

Philosophy

Political science

Econometrics

Artificial intelligence

Economics

Microeconomics

Geometry

Computer science

Democracy

Preference

Mechanism (biology)

Market economy

Voting

AEA Papers and Proceedings

Can mechanism design save democracy? We propose a simple design that offers a chance: individuals pay for as many votes as they wish using a number of “voice credits” quadratic in the votes they buy. Only quadratic cost induces marginal costs linear in votes purchased and thus welfare optimality if individuals' valuation of votes is proportional to their value of changing the outcome. A variety of analysis and evidence suggests that this still-nascent mechanism has significant promise to robustly correct the failure of existing democracies to incorporate intensity of preference and knowledge.

Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy