Gene

Control (management)

Exploit

Dictatorship

Computer security

Redistribution (election)

Economics

Biochemistry

Computer science

Business

Authoritarianism

Politics

Political science

Democracy

Public economics

Political economy

Sociology

Electronic surveillance

Artificial intelligence

Chemistry

Psychological repression

Gene expression

American Journal of Political Science

This article studies the consequences of digital surveillance in dictatorships. I first develop an informational theory of repression and co‐optation. I argue that digital surveillance resolves dictators' information problem of not knowing individual citizens' true anti‐regime sentiments. By identifying radical opponents, digital surveillance enables dictators to substitute targeted repression for nonexclusive co‐optation to forestall coordinated uprisings. My theory implies that as digital surveillance technologies advance, we should observe a rise in targeted repression and a decline in universal redistribution. Using a difference‐in‐differences design that exploits temporal variation in digital surveillance systems among Chinese counties, I find that surveillance increases local governments' public security expenditure and arrests of political activists but decreases public goods provision. My theory and evidence suggest that improvements in governments' information make citizens worse off in dictatorships.

To Repress or to Co‐opt? Authoritarian Control in the Age of Digital Surveillance