Quantum mechanics

Philosophy

Microeconomics

Computer security

Operating system

Economics

Power (physics)

Computer science

Physics

Dilemma

Mathematics

Epistemology

Block (permutation group theory)

Geometry

Game theory

Fork (system call)

Mining attacks allow attackers to gain an unfair share of the mining reward by deviating from the honest mining strategy in the Bitcoin system. Among the most well-known are block withholding (BWH), fork after withholding (FAW), and selfish mining. In this paper, we propose two new strategies: power adjusting and bribery racing, and introduce two novel mining attacks, Power Adjusting Withholding (PAW) and Bribery Selfish Mining (BSM) adopting the new strategies. Both attacks can increase the reward of attackers. Furthermore, we show PAW can avoid the "miner's dilemma" in BWH attacks. BSM introduces a new "venal miner's dilemma", which results in all targets (bribes) willing to help the attacker but getting less reward finally. Quantitative analyses and simulations are conducted to verify the effectiveness of our attacks. We propose some countermeasures to mitigate the new attacks, but a practical and efficient solution remains to be an open problem.

Power Adjusting and Bribery Racing