Cognitive psychology

Psychology

Perfectionism (psychology)

Social psychology

Journal of Global Ethics

AbstractAlthough the problem of adaptiveness plays an important motivating role in her work on human capabilities, Martha Nussbaum never gives a clear account of the controversial concept of adaptive preferences on which she relies. In this paper, I aim both to reconstruct the most plausible account of the concept that may be attributed to Nussbaum and to provide a critical appraisal of that account. Although her broader work on the capabilities approach moves progressively towards political liberalism as time passes, I aim to show that her account of adaptive preferences continues to maintain her earlier commitment to perfectionism about the good. I then distinguish between two obligatory kinds of respect for persons, which I call, respectively, primary and secondary recognition respect. This distinction allows us to see that her perfectionist account of adaptive preferences allows her to show persons primary but not secondary recognition respect. Ultimately, I claim that an acceptable account of adaptive preferences must succeed in showing persons both types of respect. I conclude with some preliminary remarks on what such an account might look like.Keywords: adaptive preferenceperfectionismNussbaumpolitical liberalismrespect FundingThis research was supported by an Australian Research Council Postgraduate Award (Industry) associated with the ARC Linkage Project 'Assessing Development: Designing Better Indices of Poverty and Gender Equity'.Notes on contributorRosa Terlazzo is an Assistant Professor in Philosophy at Kansas State University. Her research is in social and political philosophy, with an emphasis on adaptive preferences, children, and the responsibility to resist oppression.Notes1 Sen's work on the capabilities approach is perhaps even more influential than Nussbaum's own (Citation1988, Citation1992, Citation1999). I leave his work aside in this article because he does not make the same substantive value commitments that I argue render Nussbaum's account problematic.2 Khader's account differs from Nussbaum's in substantive ways as well. Khader holds that Nussbaum's method of developing a list of capabilities is elitist, and that Nussbaum is ultimately mistaken to turn away from a perfectionist account of adaptive preferences. As my discussion of perfectionism in this paper should suggest, I take Khader's appeal to perfectionism to undermine her otherwise excellent account of adaptive preferences.3 This account, offered by Jon Elster, is the one that initiated discussion of adaptive preferences in philosophy (see Elster Citation1982).4 For various versions of Nussbaum's list of capabilities, see Nussbaum (Citation1992, 222; Citation2000b, 86–88; Citation2006, 76–78; Citation2011a, 33–34). I do not include a complete list here both for considerations of space, and because, as we will see, my argument depends on the possibility that any of its various items could be controversial, not on the claim that any particular item is in fact problematic.5 Strictly, the phrase 'a perfectionist account of adaptive preferences' makes little sense, since perfectionism is concerned with human excellences – or at least goods – while adaptive preferences are generally thought of as preferences for things that are neither excellent nor good. Nevertheless, for simplicity's sake, I will often use the phrase 'a perfectionist account of adaptive preferences' to mean 'an account of adaptive preferences defined in terms of a perfectionist account of human good'.6 It may well be the case that both kinds of recognition respect are only pro tanto obligatory for the state. In some cases, the state may have obligations to some citizens which are strong enough to override its obligations to show other citizens secondary recognition respect. Think here of the post-Second World War German state's obligations to protect the interests of those targeted by neo-Nazis. I take no stand on this point; it is sufficient for my argument that the state should avoid making truth claims that violate secondary recognition respect when it can afford to do so. I thank an anonymous reviewer and the editors of this journal for pushing me on this point.7 A note on terminology: calling this form of recognition respect 'secondary' might suggest that it is less important than primary recognition respect. I take no stand on this issue, and note only that some of the major criticisms of adaptive preferences in the literature are more closely tied to secondary recognition respect than to primary (Narayan Citation2002; Baber Citation2007, 126). Accordingly, a defensible account of adaptive preferences should be prepared to show persons both kinds of respect.8 Note that this is a point about how one values a capability, not about whether she chooses a functioning. Even on a fully perfectionist account of capabilities, the person who chooses to fast for religious reasons need not have an adaptive preference, since she may value both the capability for religious observance and the capability to be adequately nourished – she may merely be choosing between incompatible functionings in a particular instance. I thank an editor of this journal for pushing me to clarify this point.9 In later works, Nussbaum shifts to talking about 'lives worthy of human dignity' (Citation2006, Citation2011a), but continues to tie lives worthy of human dignity to the question of whether 'certain ways of life that human beings are forced to lead' are 'fully human' (Citation2011a, 78).10 Of course, not all adaptive preferences will fall among a person's 'deepest and most reasoned convictions', and those that do not may not raise the same problems for respect. But as long as at least some adaptive preferences do fall within that set, the problem for respect remains. For my argument that Nussbaum's perfectionism identifies some deep and reasoned convictions as adaptive preferences, see below. For a perfectionist argument that some adaptive preferences involve agency and moral reasoning, see Khader (Citation2012, Citation2013).11 I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this possibility.12 Presumably Nussbaum would not want to hold that persons who have adaptive preferences entirely fail to engage in practical reasoning. For related problems, see Jaggar (Citation2006).13 There remains the possibility that Nussbaum might offer a procedural justification, according to which a person's conception of the good counts as reasonable insofar as she meaningfully holds all of the capabilities on the list. I discuss the problem with this suggestion below.14 For instance: 'the capabilities in question are important for each and every citizen' (Citation2000b, 6); 'a list of human capabilities that are indispensable for any citizen' (Citation2000b, 165); 'What would it be to treat each citizen as an end, promoting the full range of the human capabilities?' (Citation2000b, 252).15 Recall again that I am concerned here only with truth claims. The state might make some action, such as recreational drug use, illegal on the grounds that it tends to lead to harm, without denying that it might have any moral value. Of course, as the interest involved becomes more fundamental, as it might in the case of dangerous initiation rites, the situation becomes more complicated, and space constraints unfortunately prevent me from discussing the most complicated cases here. For discussion of fundamental interests, see LaFollette (Citation2000).16 Indeed, internal capability might even effect a person's combined capability to read if she has learned to do so but fails to see the activity as in any way valuable – which it might be rational to do if, as in the classic case of adaptive preference, she takes reading to have no value as a result of the inaccessibility of reading materials.17 I return below to the question of whether an adaptive preference must still be a function of deprivation or a matter of injustice.18 This commitment to the substance of the list is enforced when she calls preferences that conflict with her list 'corrupt and mistaken' (Citation2000b, 160), and 'inadequate' and 'unwise' (Citation2000b, 161).19 Recall that in some cases, a person may see an option as valuable without preferring it. This is obvious in cases of trade-offs between goods, such as the example offered by Nussbaum of the person who chooses to fast for religious reasons, trading the good of being well nourished for the good of spiritual gain. But the cases that provide the greatest problems for secondary recognition respect are not of this sort: they are the cases in which persons, rather than making trade-offs between goods, simply deny that one 'good' is a good at all.

The perfectionism of Nussbaum's adaptive preferences