Computers & Industrial Engineering

• A tripartite evolutionary game model is proposed to study stakeholders’ strategies. • There exist six kinds of evolutionary stable strategies. • The evolutionary stable strategy will be different under different conditions. • Social supervision affects the strategy choice of the government and enterprise. • There are several key variables and parameters influencing evolutionary results. Natural disasters seriously threaten the security and stability of human society. After natural disasters occur, humanitarian rescue is the top priority to prepare sufficient emergency supplies and send to disaster areas. However, many disaster relief practices worldwide show that there is always a huge supply gap in the initial stage. It is difficult to meet the tremendous materials demand of the disaster area only by separate reserve from the government or humanitarian relief organizations (HROs). Because of this problem, this paper takes emergency supplies joint reserve mode (ESJRM) as the research subject, and explores the specific conditions and influencing factors of realizing government-enterprise cooperation by establishing a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, enterprise and society. We aim at obtaining the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of this tripartite evolutionary game system. It is found that the equilibrium of tripartite strategy is affected by income variables, cost variables, initial willingness and stakeholder behaviors. Focusing on these influences, we put forward some management inspirations and suggestions. This paper makes a preliminary exploration of the conditions of ESJRM, which is conducive to providing theoretical guidance for the practice of emergency supplies reserve.

A tripartite evolutionary game model of emergency supplies joint reserve among the government, enterprise and society