Emergence of multilevel selection in the prisoner's dilemma game on coevolving random networks
Abstract
We study the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game, whereby a coevolutionary rule is introduced that molds the random topology of the interaction network in two ways. First, existing links are deleted whenever a player adopts a new strategy or its degree exceeds a threshold value; second, new links are added randomly after a given number of game iterations. These coevolutionary processes correspond to the generic formation of...
Paper Details
Title
Emergence of multilevel selection in the prisoner's dilemma game on coevolving random networks
Published Date
Sep 22, 2009
Journal
Volume
11
Issue
9
Pages
093033 - 093033
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