Selective attention to historical comparison or social comparison in the evolutionary iterated prisoner’s dilemma game
Abstract
This paper investigates an evolutionary iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) model of multiple agents, in which agents interact in terms of the pair-wise IPD game while adapting their attitudes towards income stream risk. Specifically, agents will become more risk averse (or more risk seeking) if their game payoffs exceed (or fall below) their expectations. In particular, agents use their peers’ average payoffs as expectations (social comparison)...
Paper Details
Title
Selective attention to historical comparison or social comparison in the evolutionary iterated prisoner’s dilemma game
Published Date
May 16, 2020
Volume
53
Issue
8
Pages
6043 - 6078
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