Epistemology

Complete information

Econometrics

Game theory

Programming language

Information structure

Philosophy

Artificial intelligence

Economics

Set (abstract data type)

Selection (genetic algorithm)

Physics

Mathematical economics

Equilibrium selection

Bayesian probability

Repeated game

Mathematics

Mathematical optimization

Astrophysics

Bayes' theorem

Computer science

Variation (astronomy)

Linguistics

Bayesian game

Simple (philosophy)

Sequential game

Covariate

The Review of Economic Studies

We propose a method to estimate static discrete games with weak assumptions on the information available to players. We do not fully specify the information structure of the game but allow instead for all information structures consistent with players knowing their own payoffs. To make this approach tractable, we adopt as a solution concept Bayes correlated equilibrium (BCE). We characterize the sharp identified set under BCE and unrestricted equilibrium selection, and find that in simple games with limited variation in covariates identified sets are informative. In an application, we estimate a model of entry in the Italian supermarket industry and quantify the effect of large malls on local supermarkets. Estimates and predictions differ from those obtained under more restrictive assumptions.

Estimation of Discrete Games with Weak Assumptions on Information