Control (management)

Labour economics

Inequality

Exploit

Microeconomics

Computer security

Economics

Rental housing

Computer science

Mathematics

Politics

Management

Rent-seeking

Political science

Mathematical analysis

Economic rent

Renting

American Economic Review

Using a 1994 law change, we exploit quasi-experimental variation in the assignment of rent control in San Francisco to study its impacts on tenants and landlords. Leveraging new data tracking individuals’ migration, we find rent control limits renters’ mobility by 20 percent and lowers displacement from San Francisco. Landlords treated by rent control reduce rental housing supplies by 15 percent by selling to owner-occupants and redeveloping buildings. Thus, while rent control prevents displacement of incumbent renters in the short run, the lost rental housing supply likely drove up market rents in the long run, ultimately undermining the goals of the law. (JEL R23, R31, R38)

The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco