Registered Replication Report : Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012)

Volume: 12, Issue: 3, Pages: 527 - 542
Published: Mar 1, 2017
Abstract
In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies using time pressure have been mixed, with some replication attempts observing similar patterns (e.g., Rand et al.,...
Paper Details
Title
Registered Replication Report : Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012)
Published Date
Mar 1, 2017
Volume
12
Issue
3
Pages
527 - 542
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