Evolution of cooperation driven by the diversity of emotions

Published on Jan 1, 2015in Connection Science1.042
· DOI :10.1080/09540091.2014.956290
Neng-gang Xie10
Estimated H-index: 10
(Anhui University of Technology),
Kai-xuan Zhen1
Estimated H-index: 1
(Anhui University of Technology)
+ 2 AuthorsLu Wang8
Estimated H-index: 8
(Anhui University of Technology)
Biotic individuals often compare their own payoffs with those of others, which results in endogenetic emotions ranging from compassion to harshness towards a weaker player or from respect to envy feeling against a stronger fellow. Consequently, the individual reaction can be a cooperative or defect act. Our paper establishes possible interactions between emotional characteristics and behaviour modes of individuals. For this purpose, a genetic algorithm is used to study the evolutionary process within the framework of a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Our results highlight that the diversity of emotions can emerge spontaneously that is fruitful for the general cooperative act. Furthermore, it turned out that compassion is more important than respect, but both attitudes have better adaptability than harshness or envy feeling.
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