Illusion of Transparency

Published on Dec 1, 2007in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
· DOI :10.1080/00048400701654820
Laura Schroeter9
Estimated H-index: 9
(University of Melbourne)
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Abstract
It's generally agreed that, for a certain a class of cases, a rational subject cannot be wrong in treating two elements of thought as co-referential. Even anti-individualists like Tyler Burge agree that empirical error is impossible in such cases. I argue that this immunity to empirical error is illusory and sketch a new anti-individualist approach to concepts that doesn't require such immunity.
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