Laura Schroeter
University of Melbourne
Competence (human resources)EpistemologyPhilosophy of languageInternalism and externalismFolk psychologyPossible worldPhilosophySociologyPsychologyMetaphysicsSemantics (computer science)Computational semanticsSubject (philosophy)Semantic externalismMeaning (existential)ContextualismComputer scienceNormativeInterpretation (philosophy)Realism
37Publications
9H-index
227Citations
Publications 37
Newest
4 CitationsSource
#2Laura SchroeterH-Index: 9
Last. Kevin TohH-Index: 5
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#1Laura Schroeter (University of Melbourne)H-Index: 9
#2François Schroeter (University of Melbourne)H-Index: 7
The Generalized Integration Challenge (GIC) is the task of providing, for a given domain of discourse, a simultaneously acceptable metaphysics, epistemology and metasemantics and showing them to be so. In this paper, we focus on a metaethical position for which (GIC) seems particularly acute: the brand of normative realism which takes normative properties to be (i) mind-independent and (ii) causally inert. The problem is that these metaphysical commitments seem to make normative knowledge imposs...
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#1Karen Jones (University of Melbourne)H-Index: 7
#2François Schroeter (University of Melbourne)H-Index: 7
Last. Laura Schroeter (University of Melbourne)H-Index: 9
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We extend Haslanger’s model of the way social meanings shape our beliefs and desires to discuss the ways in which they shape our emotional responses. We argue that emotional regulation is a core me...
1 CitationsSource
#1Laura SchroeterH-Index: 9
In “Reasons and Justifiability”, Laura Schroeter and Francois Schroeter argue that an anti-individualistic version of the conceptual approach offers powerful resources to address the disagreement problem, at least within a given linguistic community. The key to competence with the meaning of moral terms, they argue, isn’t mastery of a specific folk theory or criterion of application. Rather, it is being appropriately connected to a linguistic community. The essay clarifies the type of a priori m...
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#1Laura Schroeter (University of Melbourne)H-Index: 9
#2François Schroeter (University of Melbourne)H-Index: 7
AbstractIn this paper, we argue that ordinary judgments about core normative topics purport to attribute stable, objective properties and relations. Our strategy is first to analyze the structures and practices characteristic of paradigmatically representational concepts such as concepts of objects and natural kinds. We identify three broad features that ground the representational purport of these concepts. We then argue that core normative concepts exhibit these same features.
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#1Laura SchroeterH-Index: 9
Metaethicists disagree about the semantic content of normative and evaluative terms. To adjudicate such disagreements, we need consider different metasemantic theories, which seek to explain what makes it the case that certain words (and the thoughts they express) have the semantic contents they do. In this chapter, we explain how answers to this metasemantic question impact on debates within metaethics.
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#1Laura Schroeter (University of Melbourne)H-Index: 9
#2François Schroeter (University of Melbourne)H-Index: 7
COULD THERE BE PEACE at last in metaethics? Early expressivists like Ayer (1946) and Stevenson (1937) took their semantics for moral terms to be the very antithesis of realism about moral discourse. More recently, however, expressivists have become more conciliatory. Simon Blackburn's quasi-realist program, for instance, aims to show that expressivism has the resources to vindicate many of the apparently realist features of normative discourse (Blackburn 1984, 1993a, 1998). In his new book, Thin...
10 CitationsSource
#1Laura SchroeterH-Index: 9
6 Citations
1 Citations