Richard P. Larrick
Duke University
FeelingSocial perceptionBusinessOutcome (game theory)EconometricsPsychologyActuarial scienceEconomicsMarketingCognitionMicroeconomicsCognitive psychologyPersonalityNegotiationPerceptionChoice architecturePower (social and political)Advice (complexity)Task (project management)Public relationsComputer scienceProcess (engineering)Fuel efficiencySocial psychologySocial cognition
91Publications
37H-index
5,723Citations
Publications 87
Newest
A basic issue in social influence is how best to change one's judgment in response to learning the opinions of others. This article examines the strategies that people use to revise their quantitative estimates on the basis of the estimates of another person. The authors note that people tend to use 2 basic strategies when revising estimates: choosing between the 2 estimates and averaging them. The authors developed the probability, accuracy, redundancy (PAR) model to examine the relative effect...
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#1Katherine A. BursonH-Index: 10
#2Richard P. LarrickH-Index: 37
Last. John G. LynchH-Index: 47
view all 3 authors...
#1Richard P. Larrick (Duke University)H-Index: 37
#2Jack B. Soll (Duke University)H-Index: 18
Using "miles per gallon" as a measure of fuel efficiency leads people to undervalue the benefits of replacing the most inefficient automobiles.
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#1George Wu (U of C: University of Chicago)H-Index: 21
#2Chip Heath (Stanford University)H-Index: 27
Last. Richard P. Larrick (Duke University)H-Index: 37
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Goals have a powerful effect on performance: higher goals typically produce better performance. Previous research has proposed three key mechanisms to explain these results: effort, persistence, and attention. We present a formal model that relates these mechanisms to a single underlying process. Our model assumes that goals divide performance into two regions, gains and losses, and that the resulting gains and losses are coded according to a prospect theory value function (Kahneman & Tversky, 1...
Three studies show that negotiators consistently underestimate the size of the bargaining zone in distributive negotiations (the small-pie bias) and, by implication, overestimate the share of the surplus they claim (the large-slice bias). The authors explain the results by asymmetric disconfirmation: Negotiators with initial estimates of their counterpart's reservation price that are "inside" the bargaining zone tend to behave consistently with these estimates, which become self-fulfilling, wher...
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#1Richard P. Larrick (Duke University)H-Index: 37
#2Katherine A. Burson (UM: University of Michigan)H-Index: 10
Last. Jack B. Soll (Duke University)H-Index: 18
view all 3 authors...
Abstract A common social comparison bias—the better-than-average-effect—is frequently described as psychologically equivalent to the individual-level judgment bias known as overconfidence. However, research has found “Hard–easy” effects for each bias that yield a seemingly paradoxical reversal: Hard tasks tend to produce overconfidence but worse-than-average perceptions, whereas easy tasks tend to produce underconfidence and better-than-average effects. We argue that the two biases are in fact p...
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#1Richard P. Larrick (Duke University)H-Index: 37
#2Jack B. Soll (Duke University)H-Index: 18
Averaging estimates is an effective way to improve accuracy when combining expert judgments, integrating group members' judgments, or using advice to modify personal judgments. If the estimates of two judges ever fall on different sides of the truth, which we term bracketing, averaging must outperform the average judge for convex loss functions, such as Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD). We hypothesized that people often hold incorrect beliefs about averaging, falsely concluding that the average of ...
#1Richard P. Larrick (Duke University)H-Index: 37
#2Jack B. Soll (Duke University)H-Index: 18
Source
#1Richard P. Larrick (Duke University)H-Index: 37
#2Jack B. Soll (Duke University)H-Index: 18
Averaging estimates is an effective way to improve accuracy when combining expert judgments, integrating group members judgments, or using advice to modify personal judgments. If the estimates of two judges ever fall on different sides of the truth, which we term bracketing, averaging must outperform the average judge for convex loss functions, such as mean absolute deviation (MAD). We hypothesized that people often hold incorrect beliefs about averaging, falsely concluding that the average of t...
Source
#1Katherine A. Burson (UM: University of Michigan)H-Index: 10
#2Richard P. Larrick (Duke University)H-Index: 37
Last. Joshua Klayman (U of C: University of Chicago)H-Index: 17
view all 3 authors...
People are inaccurate judges of how their abilities compare to others'. Kruger and Dunning (1999; 2002) argue that most inaccuracy is attributable to unskilled performers' lack of metacognitive skill to evaluate their performance. They overestimate their standing, whereas skilled performers accurately predict theirs. Consequently, the majority of people believe they are above average. However, not all tasks show this bias. In a series of ten tasks across three studies, we show that moderately di...
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